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WHY FIVE? THE STRANGE, MAGNETIC, AND
MESMERIZING AFFECT OF THE FIVE
PERCENT UNITRUST AND SPENDING
RATE ON SETTLORS, THEIR ADVISERS,
AND RETIREES
Joel C. Dobris*
Editors’ Synopsis: Investment literature aimed at trustees and retirees
often assumes that investors can obtain a return sufficient to support a
five percent annual payout without impairing capital. According to the
author, truly sophisticated commentators see this as over-optimistic. This
disconnect between investor fantasy and investment reality is the topic of
this Article. The author explores the idea primarily in a trust context.
“I often say that when you can measure what you are speaking about, and express
it in numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it,
when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and
unsatisfactory kind:  it may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely,
in your thoughts, advanced to the stage of science, whatever the matter may be.”**
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Assets support people and missions in a variety of contexts. Of interest
here are trusts, retirement nest eggs, and endowments. The problem is that
people do not understand capital’s capacity to support. They do not
understand what money can and cannot do for them. People are too
optimistic about the productivity or “fecundity”1 of capital. They frame the
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Spring 2005, at 44.
2 Obviously, this is a simplification. Some trustees can make 5% (e.g., Yale’s
endowment and large trusts for well-advised rich people). See Tom Sullivan, Ivy Endow-
ments Increase Over 16 Percent: University Yet to Release Numbers, But Five Peers
Report High Returns, YALE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 17, 2004, available at
http://www.yaledailynews.com/article.asp?Aid=26251 (last visited Feb. 23, 2005). Other
trusts properly may diminish principal (e.g., old impoverished widows with small trusts).
Purpose and context are vital to understanding. Putting it another way, at one extreme
some people view their capital as an endowment—the endowment is not to be violated. At
the other extreme, some people want to fully cannibalize their principal—they want to die
with one nickel left. Most of us are in the middle; there’s not enough money to live on
income alone, but we want to have some principal to pass on to the next generation. We
are the quasi-cannibals. We will eat arms, but we will not eat legs.
3 As an essay, and a piece of professional literature, many statements in this Article
are based on observation, experience, intuition, and situation. The finding of empirical
proof, or disproof, must be the task of others. I began another essay of mine, written a few
years ago, with the same sentence and the same footnote. I have paid my taxes for fifty
years and I am damn well going to write what I please. See Joel C. Dobris, The Death of
the Rule Against Perpetuities, or the RAP Has No Friends—An Essay, 35 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 601, 603, n.1 (2000) [hereinafter Dobris, The Death of the Rule Against
Perpetuities]. I make the point elsewhere by quoting Lawrence Friedman. See Lawrence
M. Friedman, Name Robbers: Privacy, Blackmail, and Assorted Matters in Legal History,
30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1093, 1094 (2002): 
Much of what follows in this Article is speculative and qualitative. But this is an
exploration of legal culture, and indeed, an exploration of past legal culture; the
kind of legal archaeology this Article represents almost always suffers from a
lack of rigor. Some aspects of this Article might be (and should be) tested
issue incorrectly. In trying to understand capital’s support capacity, many
people think in percentage terms: “I expect to earn 5% total return on my
money.” I think traditional trust income is a better measure of capital’s
support capacity, and if people must think in percentages, 5% is too high
(in early 2005).
I believe this over-optimism and preference for approaching produc-
tivity in percentage terms leads too many people to be sure they can get a
5% total return. I believe this will lead to people diminishing their princi-
pal to the point that a remainder interest in trust will be devalued or even
destroyed. Similarly, I despair of the inheritances of retirees’ heirs, and in
some circumstances, I can see retirees running out of money.
I find it all boils down to this: too many settlors of prototypical trusts
concluding they can create trusts that give A, the income beneficiary, a 5%
return and give B, the remainder beneficiary, unimpaired, and even en-
hanced, principal.2 It ain’t so. 
This is an essay.3 It is not an empirical study or a theory. It asks and
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empirically; but for other aspects, the data are simply not at hand.
As quoted in Joel C. Dobris, Speculations on the Idea of “Speculation” in Trust Investing:
An Essay, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 439, 439 n.* (2004) [hereinafter Dobris, Specula-
tions on the Idea of “Speculation” in Trust Investing].
4 See James P. Garland, The Problems With Unitrusts, 1 J. PRIVATE PORTFOLIO
MGMT. 35 (1999).
5 The annuity trust rarely is used outside the charitable remainder trust arena. A
unitrust directs the trustee to pay a fixed amount to A each year out of trust assets without
regard to the size of the trust or the nature of the receipts.
6 In real life, the payments might be quarterly and the percentage might be a rolling
three year average of values.
answers a couple of interesting questions. 
In the late 1980s and into the 1990s law reformers became disen-
chanted with the regime that if a private trust said “income to A for life,
remainder to B,” then A got the receipts traditionally understood to be
income (e.g., dividends) currently and B got the receipts traditionally
understood to be principal (e.g., capital gains) at the termination of the
trust. Folks were disenchanted because trusts were not producing enough
money as income while assets seemed to be increasing in value.
For many, the solution to disenchantment was the unitrust. A unitrust
abolishes the distinction between income and principal and looks instead
to total return from a portfolio.4 The unitrust trustee pays out not tradi-
tional income, which is determined formalistically, but a fixed percentage
of the portfolio, which is measured periodically.5 In other words, some
folks concluded that a buck is a buck, and whether the money was labeled
income or principal did not matter.
If A gets a 5% unitrust interest, A’s trustee might accumulate receipts
all year and look at what was on hand on December 31st and give A 5% of
the amount on hand on January 2nd. So, if settlor put $100,000 in trust and
if the $100,000 grew to $103,000 by year’s end, then A would get $5,150
on January 2nd and the trustee would start the new year with $97,850. If
the trust was a traditional trust and the $3,000 was all traditional income, A
would get $3,000 and the trustee would start the new year with $100,000,
and if the $3,000 consisted of $2,000 traditional income and $1,000 capital
gain, A would get only $2,000 and the trustee would start the year with
$101,000.6
If a settlor chooses a unitrust, the settlor makes two decisions: (1) to
provide for the payout of some percentage of the total assets in the hands
of the trustee to the income beneficiary instead of traditional income, and
(2) what the percentage should be. Thus, any given unitrust impounds two
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7 Professor Robert H. Sitkoff may have derived a proof that the number of unitrusts is
on the rise. He hopes to write an article about this some day.
8 See Garland, supra note 4.
9 See Garland, supra note 1.
10 See Garland, supra note 4. I do not like unitrusts for several reasons, including the
extent to which shares are sold, the dividends and the potential for growth of the sold
shares are forever gone; the stream of spendable funds is volatile, even if a smoothing rule
is in place; and a great deal of the success of a unitrust, or a retirement spending plan, will
depend on when the payments are begun and what is the state of the market. I prefer a trust
that gives income to A and gives the trustee the power to invade principal for the benefit of
A to the extent and in the fashion determined by the settlor. This allows investment for
total return and does not tie the trustee to an annual payout that may not be sustainable in
a particular year.
11 See Garland, supra note 1. Simply put, people do not think clearly about investing
or capital. They do not demand dividends. They expect more of stocks than dividends and
earnings can provide. They accept fantasy over reality. They tolerate excess agency costs.
See Eugene N. White, Foxes in the Coop: Conflicts of Interests in Mutual Funds, MILKEN
INST. REV., Third Quarter 2004, at 44. They dream of lump sums when they should be
thinking of income streams. Maybe courts will misunderstand their duty when they judge
a fiduciary’s account at the end of the trust by looking at the size of the lump sum being
handed over instead of the income producing capacity of the portfolio. There is a behav-
ioral or cognitive disconnect.
ideas: (1) dump the traditional income as a payout, or spending, rule, and
(2) give the unitrust beneficiary a set percentage of the assets on hand (the
spending rate, if you will).
A surprising number of advisers and settlors seem to be drawn to uni-
trusts, and a surprising number seem to be drawn to 5% unitrusts.7 I say
surprising because I do not think unitrusts are that useful,8 and I do not
think that a 5% unitrust can operate for an extended period of time without
dramatically depleting principal (in early 2005).9
In other words, I think unitrusts are not very good,10 and that 5% is
bad.11 One of my big problems is this: in the old days, we were ready to
say “income to A remainder to B” was a one-size-fits-all for those who did
not want to have invasions of principal. A market still exists for the one-
size-fits-all trust as it always existed. Now that some of us are in love with
unitrusts, we still want the same one-size-fits-all arrangement in unitrust
form (just like the one-size-fits-all “Income to A for life” trust). The
problem is that our greater sophistication and the inevitable effect of most
unitrusts on principal means people cannot assume blithely that there is a
one-size-fits-all unitrust. Picking the percentage is serious business, more
serious than saying “Income to A for life.” Why? Because unitrusts have
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12 An interesting question, outside the scope of this Article is: What investment
portfolio should the trustee of a likely long-term, high percentage unitrust use to extend the
life of the trust as long as possible and to try to preserve some principal for the remainder
beneficiary? Ultimately, this requires the elusive talents of market timing and asset
selection. If the market is going to tank, how about 100% short-term bonds? If the market
is going to soar, how about 100% equities? If the market is going to stand still, how about
superb selection of specific assets such as the stock of the year?
13 A “rentier” is “one who lives off income from capital.” Barbara H. Fried, Fairness
and the Consumption Tax, 44 STAN. L. REV. 961, 974 n.36 (1992). Of course, rentiers are
not all rich; it just seems that way sometimes.
14 “Grandpa Chase had died and left me and Bella each a legacy that threw off an
annual income of twenty-five thousand dollars. Mother, of course, got the residue.” LOUIS
AUCHINCLOSS, The Epicurean, in THREE LIVES 1, 46 (1993). “[B]ut his share had still been
enough, given his easy habit of never distinguishing between principal and income, to
maintain hospitable mansions in town and country and equip his family with mounts for
the fox hunting that he loved more than life itself.” Louis Auchincloss, The Realist, in
THREE LIVES 89, 93 (1993). Auchincloss also pursues the theme in Louis Auchincloss,
Finish Good Lady, in THE INJUSTICE COLLECTORS 64 (Signet ed. 1949, 1950) (formerly
published as THE UNHOLY THREE AND OTHER STORIES). James Hilton’s Mr. Chips knew to
spend only income: “After 1929, Chips did not leave Brookfield . . . . His income was
more than he needed to spend, and his small capital, invested in gilt-edged stocks, did not
suffer when the slump set in.” JAMES HILTON, GOOD-BYE, MR. CHIPS 109-10 (Little,
Brown, & Co.) (1934).
15 “Yet many investors are happy to spend their dividends, but are deeply reluctant to
dip into capital.” Jonathan Clements, Behavioral Specialists Put Investors on Couch,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 1995, at C1.
16 “Bond[s] . . . used to have paper interest coupons attached. The well-heeled would
clip the coupons [periodically and] . . . redeem their interest payments.” John Waggoner,
To Understand Bonds, Think Like Lender; You Can Expect Some Income But not Big
Gains USA TODAY, Apr. 11, 2003, at B3.
17 See Garland, supra note 1.
18 I have chosen to leave the topic of cannibalization outside the scope of this Article. As to
the topic, see William P. Bengen, Determining Withdrawal Rates Using Historical Data, J. FIN.
the capacity to exhaust principal and the old income-only trusts did not.12
The same problem affects people who have saved a nest egg for re-
tirement or who have inherited capital. They need to decide what they will
spend each year to sustain them or to supplement other income. Histori-
cally, sensible, seriously rich people living on capital (rentiers)13 sought to
live on their income,14 spend their dividends,15 or clip their coupons,16 in
order not to impair capital.17 Retirees who have amassed a large enough
nest egg can have a goal of preserving their capital and living either on a
fixed percentage of their assets or on their income. Folks with less money
know, or should know, they will need to cannibalize their capital—their
nest eggs—in retirement.18
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PLAN., Oct. 1994, at 171; Jonathan Clements, Retirement Models that Let Reality Bite, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 20, 2001, at C1; William J. Bernstein, The Retirement Calculator from Hell, EFFICIENT
FRONTIER, at http://www.efficientfrontier.com/ef/998/hell.htm (1998).
19 I could call that the “How come so much?” question but I will not.
20 I thank Esther Wright for the “Why five?” label.
21 See Patrick J. Collins & Josh Stampfli, Promises and Pitfalls of Total Return
Trusts, 27 AM. C. TR. EST. COUNS. 205 (2001); Garland, supra note 4; Alvin J. Golden,
Total Return Unitrusts: Is This a Solution in Search of a Problem?, 28 AM. C. TR. EST.
COUNS. 121 (2002); Robert B. Wolf, Estate Planning with Total Return Trusts: Meeting
Human Needs and Investment Goals Through Modern Trust Design, 36 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR. J. 169 (2001); Robert B. Wolf & Stephen R. Leimberg, Total Return Trusts Ap-
proved by New Regs., but State Law is Crucial, 31 EST. PLAN. 179 (2004). I have written
the following articles with greater and lesser relevance to this topic: Joel C. Dobris, New
Forms of Private Trusts for the Twenty-First Century—Principal and Income, 31 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1 (1996) [hereinafter Dobris, New Forms of Private Trusts]; Joel C.
Dobris, Real Return, Modern Portfolio Theory, and College, University, and Foundation
Decisions on Annual Spending from Endowments: A Visit to the World of Spending Rules,
28 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 49 (1993) [hereinafter Dobris, Real Return]; Joel C. Dobris,
Why Trustee Investors Often Prefer Dividends to Capital Gain and Debt Investments to
Equity—Daunting Principal and Income Problem, 32 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 255
(1997) [hereinafter Dobris, Why Trustee Investors Often Prefer Dividends].
I have wondered over the years why the unitrust has such a mesmeriz-
ing effect on settlors, advisers, and commentators and why the percentage
is so often 5%. This Article is my modest attempt to answer those ques-
tions. Let us begin.
This Article has two Sections. The first discusses why people are in-
terested in a percentage solution—why the traditional regime did not work
for some folks and why the percentage solution is problematic. The second
discusses why the percentage is higher than I think it should be at this
time, and why the chosen percent so often is 5%.
I.  WHY PERCENTAGE PAYOUTS?
As indicated, this Article is about why people choose a 5% payout for
their unitrusts, from their retirement savings, or their endowments, when
5% will cause a diminution of principal, at this time. We can divide this
question into two simpler questions: (1) “Why do people favor a fixed
percentage payout?,” which I will refer to as the “percentage question,”
and (2) “Why do people pick too high a percentage,19 more specifically
5%?,” which I will refer to as the “why five question.”20
I would like to address the percentage question first. Why has a mean-
ingful switch from the traditional income-only trust to the fixed percentage
unitrust occurred?21
46 40 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST JOURNAL
22 See E. James Gamble, If It’s the 1990s, It Must Be Time for Another Principal and
Income Act, 32 INST. ON EST. PLAN. § 800 (1998); see also UNIF. PRINCIPAL AND INCOME
ACT § 3 (1931 ACT), 7B U.L.A. 251 (2000); UNIF. PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 13 (1962
ACT), 7B U.L.A. 232 (2000); UNIF. PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT (1997 ACT), 7B U.L.A.
162 (2000).
23 See Gamble, supra note 22; see also UNIF. PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 1 (1931
ACT), 7B U.L.A. 246 (2000); UNIF. PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 3 (1962 ACT), 7B
U.L.A. 206 (2000); UNIF. PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 102 (1997 Act), 7B U.L.A. 138
(2000).
24 See, e.g., In re Trust of Catherwood, 173 A.2d 86 (Pa. 1961) (resolving a dispute
between a life tenant and remaindermen because of trustee’s allocations).
25 A dividends-only spending rule was informally benchmarked in the psyche to a
percentage standard, and as dividends as a percentage of portfolio value went down, folks
began to feel sorry for themselves. They should not have. See Garland, supra note 1.
26 See JOEL C. DOBRIS, ET AL., ESTATES AND TRUSTS 1092-93 (2d ed. 2003); Dobris,
Real Return, supra note 21, at 53; Dobris, The Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities,
supra note 3, at 627-31. See generally Dobris, New Forms of Private Trusts, supra note 21
A. A Bit of History 
The terms of the traditional trust, simplified, were “income to A for
life, remainder to B.” When a receipt came in the mail, the trustee’s job
was to know if the receipt was income or principal. If the receipt was
income, the trustee was to pay it to A, and if the receipt was principal, the
trustee was to allocate the receipt to B’s account on the trust’s books and
eventually pay it to B.22 A trustee would learn what was principal and
income from the local principal and income act and local case law.23 While
the system sounds simple, fights often arose about trustee allocations.24
Furthermore, a trustee, in choosing the investments, had to be impartial
between income and principal. A splendid investment portfolio that gen-
erated a large annual return in the form of traditional income often was
unfair to the typical principal beneficiary, and a splendid investment port-
folio that generated a large return in the form of capital gain often was
unfair to the typical income beneficiary. The historical solution was to tell
the trustee to pick a portfolio that generated a return that was fair to both
income and principal. The rule often meant that the trustee had to choose
an inferior portfolio of investments. The trustee paid a high price for al-
location of return services. Advances in investment theory, a sharp rise in
stock prices, and fashions in whether or not to pay dividends25 led to a
situation in which (1) trustees were expected to invest portfolios for total
return without regard to the distinction between income and principal, and
(2) trustees found that much of the return from a well-invested portfolio
came in the mail in the form of capital gain allocable to principal.26 With
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(covering modern trust options dealing with principal and income distinctions for total
return on investments); Dobris, Why Trustee Investors Often Prefer Dividends, supra note
21 (illustrating principal, income, and debt preferences in trust investment). 
27 See UNIF. PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 104 (1997 Act), 7B U.L.A. 141 (2000).
28 Settlors create most unitrusts. Some statutes allow trustees of traditional trusts to
operate the traditional trust as if it were a unitrust. Cf., e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1340.42 (West Supp. 2004) (indirectly creating a unitrust that must be renewed annu-
ally). See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.4 (McKinney Supp. 2005); 12 DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3527(b)(1) (for conversion of a trust to a unitrust).
29 See supra note 7.
30 See Garland, supra note 1.
31 WILLIAM L. CARY & CRAIG B. BRIGHT, THE LAW AND LORE OF ENDOWMENT
FUNDS 1 (1969).
out more, this would be unfair to the income beneficiary. Thus, trustees
found they were not always able to make the best investments and fairly
allocate receipts under traditional principal and income rules. 
Two statutory solutions currently apply when traditional allocation
rules fail. One solution is to give the trustee the power to reallocate or
adjust receipts.27 The other is the unitrust.28
Of course, if the trustee has absolute discretion over income and prin-
cipal, the problems discussed in this Article disappear. The same is true if
the trustee has a meaningful power to invade principal for the income ben-
eficiary’s benefit or according to some ascertainable standard. Many
sophisticated drafters use these tools and, in a sense, do not need to read
further. But it appears that income-only trusts still are being created. 
Most private trusts created through the end of the twentieth century
were traditional trusts, to the extent they had a traditional income term, but
some believe that more and more private unitrusts are now being created.29
Essentially, all of these unitrusts direct a percentage payout. Similarly, vir-
tually all the writing about spending retirement nest eggs is couched in
terms of spending a percentage of assets on hand. Why?
These days, most people think about percentages in terms of total re-
turn,30 but it was not always that way. We used to think in terms of interest
or income. Traditional spending practices for endowment funds limited
spending to income, defined as dividends and interest. Traditional trusts
paid the income to A and the remainder to B. Everything changed in the
1960s with the Ford Foundation31 and the Ivy League leading the way.
Professor Williamson, one of the leaders in the process of change wrote
that“[t]he Yale University Treasurer’s Report for 1965-66 posed the first
explicit challenge to the then universally accepted premise that the appro-
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32 J. PETER WILLIAMSON, FUNDS FOR THE FUTURE 102 (1993).
33 See id. at 103; RICHARD M. ENNIS & J. PETER WILLIAMSON, SPENDING POLICY FOR
EDUCATIONAL ENDOWMENTS 7-8 (1976).
34 See CARY & BRIGHT, supra note 31.
35 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 32, at 103-04; ENNIS & WILLIAMSON, supra note 33,
at 7-8.
36 See UNIF. MGMT. OF INST. FUNDS ACT, 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 475 (1999). UMIFA is
being revised and Professor Susan Gary is the reporter. See UNIF. MGMT. OF INST. FUNDS
ACT preface & introductory cmts. (Tentative Draft Jan. 2005), at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/umoifa/2005JanDraft.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2005)
(“With respect to endowment funds, the statute authorized a governing board to expend
unrealized appreciation, even if the endowment fund provided only for the distribution of
‘income.’ This provision enabled fund managers to use modern investment techniques such
as total-return investing and unitrust-style spending.”); ENNIS & WILLIAMSON, supra note
33, at 7-8.
37 ADVISORY COMM. ON ENDOWMENT MGMT., MANAGING EDUCATIONAL ENDOW-
MENTS 9 (2d ed. 1972).
priate amount to spend from an endowment fund is the income yield from
dividends and interest.”32 The booming stock market of the 1950s and
1960s delivered high returns, but much of it came from appreciation or
capital gains, not dividends.33 Thus, an endowment fund invested solely in
bonds delivered plenty of income while losing real value, and a fund
invested solely in stocks grew in real value but delivered too little tradi-
tional income. Endowment fund managers invested in bonds to get current
income and gave up investments with favorable growth prospects because
of their low current yield.34 But the rising inflation of the late 1960s
undermined any value this investment approach had. Not only did the
value of the income stream diminish, but the capital value of the bonds at
redemption did as well.35 This new understanding of total return (that
return can come in the form of capital appreciation, dividends, and inter-
est) led to the enactment of the Uniform Management of Institutional
Funds Act of 1972 (“UMIFA”).36
To recap, conservative endowment managers of the 1960s focused on
“safety and income rather than on seeking maximum long-term total re-
turn.”37 This seemed unwise and led to a change in investment allocations
and to the law of endowment spending. Events in the market caused folks
to think about slicing a little bit off the salami.
B. Fixed Percentages are Cheaper and Simpler
Unitrusts are easier to administer. A fixed percentage provides an easy
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38 “Simply put, a heuristic is a rule of thumb. . . . ‘A heuristic is a strategy, usually a
simplifying strategy, which provides aid and guidance in solving a problem.’” Joel C.
Dobris, Changes in the Role and the Form of the Trust at the New Millennium, or, We
Don’t Have to Think of England Anymore, 62 ALB. L. REV. 543, 548 n.27 (1998) (quoting
Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial
By Heuristics, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 123, 131 n.11 (1980-81`). What a heuristic is to a
behavioral theorist is bounded rationality to a traditional economist. Every academic
department has its own way of saying things.
39 Simply put, the trustee should allocate every receipt and every expenditure to either
income or principal using a complex set of allocation rules. See UNIF. PRINCIPAL AND
INCOME ACT (1997 Act), 7B U.L.A. 131 (2000); DOBRIS ET AL., supra note 26, at 1092-93.
40 See John H. Langbein, Reversing the Nondelegation Rule of Trust-Investment Law,
59 MO. L. REV. 105, 108 (1994). 
41 Many decision makers prefer to live in a world with fewer choices. See Barry
Schwartz, The Tyranny of Choice, SCI. AM., Apr. 2004, at 71. Rational ignorance is
rationally making decisions on the basis of inadequate information to get on with life. It
may be that the human mind requires a default answer to daunting subjective questions.
When a problem has answers all over the map, the mind yearns for, and supplies, a default
answer that likely is a compromise and that is quantified, if quantification is appropriate.
heuristic.38 Using a fixed percentage means that trustees, or the low-level
employees of corporate trustees, or the computers used by trustees, do not
need to perform complicated analyses or be programmed to perform
complicated analyses. This spares the trustee from the burdens of principal
and income allocation.39 That which is cheaper and simpler allows banks
greater profits. A fixed percentage also enlarges the pool of potential
individual trustees who can perform the trustee function without delega-
tion,40 just as it allows able trustees to spend less time on trust matters,
thus inducing more potential trustees to accept nominations in marginal
situations or to take on more trusts. Unitrusts also make the lawyer’s job
of explaining trustee duties somewhat easier. Simply put, figuring out a
percentage payout is easier than making principal and income alloca-
tions.41
C. The Unitrust Reduces the Likelihood of Lawsuits 
A number of lawsuits in trust administration involve claims of mis-
allocations of receipts or expenditures between income and principal.
These lawsuits disappear in a unitrust context.
A fixed percentage payout eliminates claims of bias in investing.
Under the traditional income trust, in which allocation between income
and principal is made according to the nature of the receipts, a trustee had
room to tilt the portfolio toward income or principal. Bonds favored
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42 Over time, bonds harm both income and principal in an inflationary environment.
See CHARLES D. ELLIS, INVESTMENT POLICY HOW TO WIN THE LOSER’S GAME, 40-42 (2d
ed. 1993).
43 Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621,
654 (2004) (observing that because the unitrust gives less discretion it reduces agency
costs). Sitkoff does believe, however, that a disproportionate share of the potential upside
from higher risk investments accrue to the remainder beneficiaries. Id. at 654. The
Uniform Principal and Income Act solves this problem in a different fashion. It gives the
trustee the power to adjust between income and principal if traditional rules of allocation
lead to an inequitable result. See UNIF. PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 104 (1997 ACT), 7B
U.L.A. 141 (2000). Banks are afraid that giving trustees the power to adjust could lead to
more lawsuits.
44 The unitrust is a “crystal” rule of private law. See generally Carol M. Rose,
Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988) (discussing “crystal”
rules of law).
45 See UNIF. PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 104 (1997 ACT), 7B U.L.A. 141 (2000).
The act is discussed in Gamble, supra note 22. Consideration of some of the issues in the
act can be found in the following articles: Dobris, Real Return, supra note 21; Joel C.
Dobris, The Probate World at the End of the Century: Is a New Principal and Income Act
in Your Future?, 28 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 393 (1993); Dobris, New Forms of Private
Trusts, supra note 21; Dobris, Why Trustee Investors Often Prefer Dividends, supra note
21. Consideration of equitable adjustments can be found in Joel C. Dobris, Limits on the
Doctrine of Equitable Adjustment in Sophisticated Postmortem Tax Planning, 66 IOWA L.
REV. 273 (1981). 
Unitrusts are discussed in Louis A. Del Cotto & Kenneth F. Joyce, Taxation of the
Trust Annuity: The Unitrust Under the Constitution and the Internal Revenue Code, 23
TAX L. REV. 257 (1967-1968); Jerold I. Horn, Prudent Investor Rule, Modern Portfolio
Theory, and Private Trusts: Drafting and Administration Including the “Give-Me-Five”
Unitrust, 33 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1 (1998); Robert B. Wolf, Total Return Trusts—
Can Your Client Afford Anything Less?, 33 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 131 (1998). For a
sophisticated, negative view of unitrusts, see Garland, supra note 4. His other papers are
referenced at http://www.jeffreyco.com.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
income42 and stocks favored principal. A trustee always had to be sure to
balance the portfolio impartially between the two interests. A unitrust
tends to eliminate this problem because income and principal beneficiaries
are on the same page; they both want the trust to prosper as much as
possible, and, disregarding taxes, they do not care whether return is in-
come or principal.43
Moreover, the settlor of the trust picks the percentage payout. If a ben-
eficiary says, “Why is this happening to me? Mommy why is she getting
so much dessert?” The answer is simple, “The settlor did it to you.” To put
it colloquially, “What don’t you understand about x percent?”44 Thus, even
I, the world’s biggest fan of section 104 of the Uniform Principal and
Income Act,45 which gives a trustee the power to allocate return equitably
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46 See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.4 (McKinney Supp. 2005). 
47 Dan Sperber, The Art of Telling Time, 8 CARTIER 88 (2004):
There’s an old joke about a man who goes to the Museum of Paleontology and
asks the director: “How old is that dinosaur there?” The director replies:
“3,000,022 years old.” The man looks at the director somewhat perplexed and
asks. “3,000,022 years old? How did you come to such a precise figure?” And
the director responds matter-of-factly: “Very simple. When I first arrived at the
museum 22 years ago, I was told that the dinosaur was 3,000,000 years old.” 
The joke plays on a discrepancy between the need for accuracy and a
preference for approximation when talking about time. 
(copy on file with author) Cartier is a jewelry catalog from the famous jewel merchant of
the same name. Dan Sperber is a well-known anthropologist. See Holly D. Doremus,
Constitutive Law and Environmental Policy, 22 STAN. ENV. L.J. 295, 330 (2003) (“The
nearly uniform call for objective decisions is understandable. Appeals to quantitative, or
what Theodore Porter calls ‘mechanically objective,’ criteria promise transparency, pre-
dictability, and consistency.”) (citing THEODORE PORTER, TRUST IN NUMBERS 11 (1995);
Gina Kolata, It Was Medical Gospel, but It Wasn’t True, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2004, § 4,
at 7:
But some say it has resulted in way too much testing and way too many biopsies.
Dr. H. Gilbert Welch, a professor of medicine at Dartmouth College and at the
Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center in White River Junction, Vt.,
attributes the appeal of the number four to “digit preference.” Doctors, he said,
like whole numbers, they like clear results.
See also Adam Gopnik, Through a Glass Darkly, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 6, 2004, at 156,
160 (“The debate is not about whether the numbers are right but whether it is right to have
numbers.”).
between income and principal when appropriate, admit there is room for
disagreement about the sufficiency of an adjustment under section 104,
and thus potential for litigation.
D. Banks Support Unitrusts
Because of the reductions in cost and complexity and the reduction in
the likelihood of lawsuits, banks support the unitrust. This means a num-
ber of states statutorily bless unitrusts46 and that banks encourage custom-
ers and their advisers to create unitrusts. Bankers get what they want from
state legislatures. Where does the five hundred pound banker sit? Any-
where he wants to.
E. Fixed Percentages Look Good
Fixed percentages have a ring, a certain and authenticating quality to
them. They seem to be derived from some trustworthy source, and they
smack of modernity. They have the authority of mathematics and num-
bers; recall the Kelvin quote at the beginning of this Article.47 As is often
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48 Barry Riley, Cry from the Heart of a Passive Manager, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2001,
at 21.
49 UNIF. MGMT. OF INST. FUNDS ACT, 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 475 (1999).
50 I.R.C. § 664 (2000).
51 See Dobris, Real Return, supra note 21.
52 A charitable remainder unitrust is an Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) sanctioned,
split interest trust that obtains various charitable deductions if the income goes to an
individual or individuals in unitrust form and the remainder goes to charity. See I.R.C.
§ 664(D)(2) (2000): 
[A] charitable remainder unitrust is a trust—
(A) from which a fixed percentage (which is not less than 5 percent nor
more than 50 percent) of the net fair market value of its assets, valued annually,
is to be paid, not less often than annually, to one or more persons (at least one of
which is not an organization described in section 170(c) and, in the case of
individuals, only to an individual who is living at the time of the creation of the
trust) for a term of years (not in excess of 20 years) or for the life or lives of such
individual or individuals,
(B) from which no amount other than the payments described in subpara-
graph (A) and other than qualified gratuitous transfers described in subparagraph
(C) may be paid to or for the use of any person other than an organization
described in section 170(c),
(C) following the termination of the payments described in subparagraph
(A), the remainder interest in the trust is to be transferred to, or for the use of, an
organization described in section 170(c) or is to be retained by the trust for such
a use or, to the extent the remainder interest is in qualified employer securities
(as defined in subsection (g)(4)), all or part of such securities are to be trans-
ferred to an employee stock ownership plan (as defined in section 4975(e)(7)) in
a qualified gratuitous transfer (as defined by subsection (g)), and
(D) with respect to each contribution of property to the trust, the value
(determined under section 7520) of such remainder interest in such property is at
least 10 percent of the net fair market value of such property as of the date such
property is contributed to the trust.
said, “This looks rather like another case in which clients would rather be
precisely wrong than approximately right. The attractions of spurious
precision are enormous.”48
F. Percentage Payments and Unitrusts Are Almost Like Old Friends
UMIFA,49 private foundation rules, and charitable remainder unitrusts
led the way.50 Advisers, prosperous donors to charities, and settlors of split
interest trusts all have become accustomed to the unitrust because of the
ubiquity of both the percentage payout from endowments51 and the chari-
table remainder unitrust.52 The percentage payment, and even more so, the
unitrust, have metamorphosed from an exotic life form into something of
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53 The Internal Revenue Service website lists the number of federal estate tax returns
filed or to be filed each year from 1980-2005, but unitrusts are not distinguished from
traditional trusts or estates. See Selected Returns and Forms Filed or to Be Filed by Type
During Specificed Calendar Years, Table 22.– Selected Returns. . . .Calendar Years, 1980-
2005, at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/04al22sr.xls. See Sitkoff, supra note 43.
54 I know that any fixed percentage is good only for a relatively short period of time
and, in a perfect world, would be reconsidered periodically. See generally Garland, supra
note 1 (discussing the inherent instability of spending based on market values). Such
reconsideration is possible in the world of college payouts from endowments. See Dobris,
Real Return, supra note 21. Garland expresses further reservations about 3%, essentially
saying it may be too high in early 2005. See Garland, supra note 1.
55 In truth, all percentages are primitive, situational, and ideally subject to change.
Three percent currently looks endowment-like and truly impartial as between income and
principal. Four percent is a rational compromise with a tilt towards income. The reader
may ask, “How is a payout to be determined?” I might answer, “Carefully.” One might or
should act mathematically, empirically. One is trying to look at real return on assets and
the current and likely future state of the market. Universities with substantial assets and
access to faculty economists often use fancy formulas that get adjusted every year. They
tend to yield under 4%. Less sophisticated institutions tend to apply a percentage that is
a commonplace.53 
We all have unitrusts now. I hope I have explained why percentages
and unitrusts are enjoying a vogue. 
G. Why Static, or Fixed, Percentages Do Not Work
The standard percentage solution does not work because the proper
payout on assets is situational, and no percentage is ever going to be right
for the long term. Payout must relate to the actual return on assets at a
particular time and in a particular economy. The correct percentage varies
over time. In the real world, a correct static, or fixed percentage will not
occur as long as markets fluctuate. If a static percentage is chosen and if
the goal is to maintain the portfolio indefinitely or turn it over to the next
generation unimpaired, the static percentage must be low because of the
risk that the economy, and thus the assets, will not support the static per-
centage over very long periods of time.
II.  WHY FIVE PERCENT
A. Why Not Three Percent?
I believe that if a unitrust is to be impartial between the income ben-
eficiary and the remainder beneficiary, it should be a 3% unitrust.54 The
retirees or other rentiers who want to turn over to their inheritors what
they began with, in real terms, should pay themselves only 3%.55 The
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often 5% against a rolling 3 year, smoothed, average of asset values in the endowment.
This approach is primitive and creates problems such as paying out too much in bad years,
creating false expectations in good years, and providing little in the way of stability for
budgeting purposes. I try to deal with this in Dobris, Real Return, supra note 21. In a
perfect world, spending of capital would be governed by a committee of wise elders.
56 Trusts often provide income to A for life, remainder to B and also provide for the
direct invasion of principal for A. See DOBRIS ET AL., supra note 26.
57 See Garland, supra note 1 (for this argument).
58 There is no such thing as a one decision payout percentage. Things change. I much
prefer the Garland Rule. Spend 125% or 130% of the dividend stream on the Standard &
Poor’s (S&P) 500 and the real return on debt investments. See James P. Garland, A
Market-Yield Spending Rule for Endowments and Trusts, FIN. ANALYSTS J., July-Aug.
1989, at 50, 55; Roger Hertog & David A. Levine, Income Versus Wealth: Making the
Trade-Off, J. INVESTING, Spring 1996, at 5. Information about other papers by Garland and
about updates of the cited paper can be found at www.jeffreyco.com. If 5% is the compro-
mise for the folks who yearn for compromise, 4% is the compromise for the folks who
think it ought to be 3%. David Levine, in his famous communication to his friends that was
mentioned in the New York Times, speaks of 4% as a compromise. See Tom Redburn,
Stocks Are Best Option for Beating Inflation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2003, at C4 (copy on
file with author). Also note that 5% is the compromise figure between 3% and 7%, the
smallest and the largest numbers one sees in this Article.
59 The text discusses higher-than arguments. I note I am a fan of the Canadian rock
group The Weakerthans. See www.theweakerthans.org (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
60 See SUPERSIZE ME (Morgan Spurlick and The Con 2004). 
61 AUCHINCLOSS, supra note 14, at 98. I prefer my own version of the thought to the
quote in the text: “What is better than one million dollars? Two million dollars.”
person who does not want to invade principal indirectly should not spend
more than 3%.56
Ultimately, the basis for my belief is outside the scope of this Article
and perhaps outside my powers of argumentation. Having said that, let me
state the point very simply and ask the reader to accept it and to continue
reading.57 Easily available equity investments cannot be counted on to
provide enough to the investor in the form of dividends or capital gain to
sustain a larger payment over time without reducing principal.58
As one might imagine, 3% is not a popular figure. Why do people
want to spend more than 3%? How come nobody listens to me?59
1. The Simplest Answer is That Bigger is Better60 
As the old saying goes, “Nothing wants two million like one[.]”61 On
a more serious note, there are more learned explanations are available.
2. Cognitive Biases Affect Decision Making
A number of cognitive biases affect decision making. According to
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62 RICHARDS J. HEUER, JR., PSYCHOLOGY OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS 111 (1999). 
63 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW.
U. L. REV. 1165, 1172 (2003).
64 MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 815 (10th ed. 2000).
65 See Monty Python, Look On The Bright Side of Life, in THE LIFE OF BRIAN
(Caroline 1997). There seems to be a disconnect between the legal world and the financial-
planning world—law’s “sensible” number is 5% and financial-planning’s “sensible” num-
ber is 7% (or even more). Why?
There are several possible explanations: (1) Lawyers are more conservative. (2) Set
tlors dealing with money in trust may be more conservative than retirees. (3) Income-only
beneficiaries of trusts are often, but not always, of secondary interest to settlors. With the
exception of surviving second spouses, the income-only trust in the well-drafted modern
instrument is for a former servant without a pension or a dependent cousin or the like. (4)
People in retirement often do not have enough capital truly to live on their income, and
5%, with its subterranean cannibalization of capital, allows retirees to pretend they are not
cannibalizing their nest eggs, when they actually are. Why pretend? Retirees pretend to
avoid worry and to avoid the idea that their children are not going to get the nice inheri-
one author. “Cognitive biases are mental errors caused by our simplified
information processing strategies.”62 Different cognitive biases may lead
people to choose a percentage that is too high and still believe they will
achieve their goal of no indirect invasion of principal.
Several cognitive biases are of interest to this Article. The first is the
optimistic bias. The optimistic bias “consists of overestimating one’s
capabilities”63 in investing or selecting an investment adviser. The optimis-
tic bias may lead people to believe they, their specially chosen trustee, or
investment adviser can get a superior return. They can then believe that
even though a percentage higher than 3% may be overly optimistic for the
ordinary investor, they can achieve a superior return. 
A standard dictionary definition of optimism is interesting to consider.
The Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines “optimism” as “an
inclination to put the most favorable construction upon actions and events
or to anticipate the best possible outcome.”64
Believing everything is going to work out allows one to save less
because whatever is saved, in belief, will get the desired result. Some
people stop at this point in their thought process. Others give their conclu-
sion meaning by assuming a return high enough to give them the cash
stream they seek. Others simply accept the assurances of advisers who say
“we believe we can obtain for our conservative clients a 7% income
stream” without questioning them. I am led to say garden variety optimism
may lead people to believe that everything will work out in the end, while
doing little or nothing to make it happen.65 Note that optimism can be a
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tance everyone thought they would get. Similarly, 5% for a surviving (second) spouse is a
convenient way to lie to oneself. Often the spouse who has married a second time is torn
between a desire to provide for the second spouse and the children of the first marriage. A
unitrust is a convenient tool for providing for both. The 5% unitrust is especially attractive
because it allows the settlor to pretend—to say that the widow will get a nice income
stream and that children will not see principal reduced. When it happens after the spouse
dies, well gosh and golly. He tried. Marketing also may be an issue. Imagine two financial
planners, with offices next to each other. One offers 3% and the other 7%. Customers will
flock to the 7% planner and, if they want to be conservative, pare it down on their own to
5%, or perhaps 6%. I thank Jim Garland for the marketing point and the articulation. 
66 As Douglas Adams wrote in THE RESTAURANT AT THE END OF THE UNIVERSE:
[T]he Total Perspective Vortex . . . [is] “the most savage psychic torture a
sentient being can undergo.” . . . [W]hen you are put into the Vortex you are
given just one momentary glimpse of the entire unimaginable infinity of cre-
ation, and somewhere in it a tiny little marker, a microscopic dot on a micro-
scopic dot, which says “You are here.” 
DOUGLAS ADAMS, THE RESTAURANT AT THE END OF THE UNIVERSE 60, 72 (1980). Thus,
the notion that the folks who recover from the serious burns do not realize the extent of
their injuries. To know the truth, to not be foolishly optimistic, is to die. Optimistic people
live better lives. “Psychologists have noted, however, a strong correlation between self-
serving biases [overoptimism, overconfidence, and egocentrism] and psychological well-
being. Only those who suffer from clinical depression, it seems, have realistic self-percep-
tion.” Rachlinski, supra note 63 (citation omitted). We are an optimistic people. See
generally DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE (1988)
(describing the foundation and formation of the American democracy and culture).
6 7  C O L U M B I A  E N C Y C L O P E D I A  ( 6 t h  e d .  2 0 0 5 ) ,  a t
http://www.freeencyclopedia.com/html/dl/denial.asp (last visited Feb. 9, 2005).
68 When the spaceship lifts, all bills are paid.
69 We may be right. See STILL RIVER RETIREMENT PLANNING SOFTWARE, INC., RETIREMENT
INCOME PLANNING, PART 3: RISK AND INVESTMENT STRATEGY FOR RETIREES, at
http://www.stillriverretire.com/Downloads/Retirement_Income_Planning_3.pdf (May 2004)
survival technique. The optimistic patients in the burn unit fare better than
the ones who understand the extent of their injuries.66 Any bias that leads
to survival is going to loom large in the mind and be part of the emotional
makeup of a large number of individuals. After all, we are the survivors. 
Another cognitive bias of interest is denial. “Denial” is “an ego de-
fense mechanism that operates unconsciously to resolve emotional con-
flict, and to allay anxiety by refusing to perceive the more unpleasant
aspects of external reality. . . . [In other words, denial is] the suppression
of reality.”67 For example, we tell ourselves the soothing lie that a higher
percentage is a sustainable, non-invasive payout rate. Of course, if the lie
is told regarding a testamentary unitrust, the settlor will not be around to
see the money run out.68 Also, the rentier in charge of personal assets
bargains with fate that the money will not run out.69 Any adviser who
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(“[M]ost expenses decline or disappear as the retiree becomes infirm and loses energy. Travel,
dining out, entertainment . . . tend to fade away. . . . Overall expenses . . . tend to stay relatively flat
for most people past their early eighties.”). Of course, this has nothing to do with a young unitrust
payment beneficiary of a lifetime unitrust. This seems as good a place as any to tell the tale of a pal
of mine who assumed he was entitled to whatever percentage he chose plus all traditional income.
70 See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 1 (1957).
71 Id. at 2.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 3.
74 Id. at 2.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 2. Cognitive dissonance is useful in financial contexts. See William N.
Goetzmann & Nadav Peles, Cognitive Dissonance and Mutual Fund Investors, 20 J. FIN.
RES. 145 (1997).
approves the higher number may well be long gone when the money runs
out. 
3. Cognitive Dissonance 
Let us now discuss the concept of cognitive dissonance. Cognitive
dissonance is a state of mind that results from holding a belief but not
following it. This situation leads to discomfort and causes people to act
imperfectly to avoid the discomfort.70 Most of the time our attitudes,
knowledge, and beliefs are consistent with our behaviors and actions, and
all is well.71 When beliefs and behaviors are inconsistent, dissonance
results.72 Thus “[t]he existence of dissonance, being psychologically
uncomfortable, will motivate the person to try to reduce the dissonance
and achieve consonance.”73 Often these inconsistencies can be rationalized
away.74 People who know about the dangers of smoking but smoke any-
way can rationalize their behavior in a number of ways: the pleasure of
smoking outweighs the health risks, the chances of getting cancer are
exaggerated, avoiding every danger out there is impossible, and if I stop
smoking I will gain weight, which is just as bad for my health.75 Some-
times inconsistencies cannot be explained away. When rationalization
fails, one is left in a state of dissonance that is psychologically uncomfort-
able. (I am in favor of recycling but still throw recyclables away, and that
makes me unhappy).76
For retirement, Able, the beneficiary, needs (or thinks he needs) x
dollars to live on, per month, or Settlor thinks Able needs x dollars as
income from a trust. Able or Settlor has a finite amount of money and
cannot easily get more principal. Five percent seems to equal Able’s
needed income (enough to live on as Able is accustomed to or wants to be
58 40 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST JOURNAL
77 FESTINGER, supra note 70, at 6. Interesting, but not directly relevant, research on
how the human and animal minds process numbers can be found in the work of Stanislas
Dehaene. See Stanislas Dehaene, What Are Numbers, Really? A Cerebral Basis for
Number Sense, EDGE, at http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/dehaene/dehaene_p2.html (last
visited Feb. 23, 2005) (proposing that humans have difficulty discriminating two close
quantities such as 4 and 5 even though there is a huge difference).
78 FESTINGER, supra note 70, at 3.
79 See discussion infra Section II.B.13.
80 FESTINGER, supra note 70, at 6.
81 Live for today for tomorrow we die, or, if you prefer, live for today and let to-
morrow take care of itself. 
82 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Precommitment Strategies in Corporate Law: The Case of
Dead Hand and No Hand Pills, 29 IOWA. J. CORP. L. 1, 5 (2003) (quoting RICHARD H.
accustomed to). Able or Settlor is convinced that 5% will not cannibalize
the principal because the reality of taking 5%, while understanding that the
money will run out, is unpleasant (dissonance). 
We convince ourselves of things that are not true to avoid or to get out
of the state of dissonance.77 “When dissonance is present . . . the person
will actively avoid situations and information which would likely increase
the dissonance.”78 Able or Settlor will avoid negative information and seek
information that confirms that 5% is okay (which is readily available, as a
later Section79 will suggest).80 Because Able or Settlor will have difficulty
coming up with more principal and Able will have difficulty cutting ex-
penses, Able or Settlor will take the easy route to reducing dissonance by
becoming convinced that spending 5% is okay.
4. Hyperbolic Discounting 
Hyperbolic discounting is over-discounting the future. Hyperbolic
discounting causes some people to gamble with their retirement savings by
taking too high a payout in the present. A sensible return is too dreary, and
too present, so some of us kid ourselves, via the hyperbolic discounting
mechanism, that a higher return is sustainable.81 The prospect of near-term
pleasure via consuming a higher percentage is more compelling than the
fear of eating dog food at some distant future time. As Richard Thaler sta-
ted:
In the morning, when temptation is remote, we vow to go to bed
early, to stick to our diet, and not have too much to drink. That
night we stay out to 3 A.M., have two helpings of chocolate dec-
adence, and sample every variety of Aquavit at a Norwegian res-
taurant.82 
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THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE 98 (1992)).
83 Id. 
84 On hyperbolic discounting, see David Laibson, Intertemporal Decision Making, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE 915, 916-19 (2003); THALER, supra note 82, at 93-
94; David Laibson & Christopher Harris, Hyperbolic Discounting and Consumption, in 1
ADVANCES IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, EIGHTH
WORLD CONGRESS 258 (Mathias Dewatripont et al. eds., 2003), cited in Cass R. Sunstein,
Lives, Life-Years–and Willingness to Pay, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 205, 215 (2004).
85 See generally Marci A. Hamilton, The Era of Entitlement. Findlaw, at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20030828.html (Aug. 28, 2003) (discussing that this
is the age of the belief that one can get what one wants).
86 See, e.g., Jonathan Clements, How Retirees Can Survive Bear Markets, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 1, 2002, at D9; Jonathan Clements, Investors’ Big Challenge: Timing the Harvest,
SACRAMENTO BEE, July 6, 2003, at D8; Jonathan Clements, Retirement Isn’t a Time to
Retreat, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2004, at D9; Jonathan Clements, Savings that Last as Long as
As Thaler also said, people “always consume more in the present than
called for by their previous plans.”83 This is so-called hyperbolic dis-
counting—for this Article, the undervaluing of leaving assets in a portfolio
for the future and overvaluing current income.84
5. People Have a Sense of Entitlement to a Certain Level of Income
I believe that many people have a built-in sense that they are entitled
to a particular total return and that when that feeling is given a number, it
turns out to be more than 3%.85 Indeed, as suggested above and discussed
below, that entitlement turns out to be about 5%. People cannot believe
that they have worked as hard as they have for their nest eggs, or an in-
heritance for their heirs, and are not entitled to some amount they calculate
by reference to their inner (often 5%) compass. Alternatively, they cannot
believe that their grandpa has left them so much money—that they have
had such good fortune—but that they are only entitled to 3%.
The preceding point goes to both the rejection of the seemingly rat-
ional 3% rate and why everybody comes up with the answer 5%. Now is
the appropriate point to begin the discussion of why people cling to the
5% spending rate.
B. Explanations About Five—Why Five?
Why the number five? Why not four or six or seven or ten? When a
percentage payout, a unitrust, or a percentage rentier or endowment spend-
ing rule is a given, why is the number five so often chosen? Why do so
many sources suggest 5% as a proper unitrust amount or as a proper
spending rate out of a retirement nest egg?86 Why do so many people
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You Do, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2001, at C1; Jonathan Clements, What Retirees Can Learn
From the Slide, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2001, at C1. In the summer of 2004, mutual fund
families began to suggest to retirees that they should not spend more than 4%. See
Managing Your Assets For Yourself and Your Heirs, IN THE VANGUARD, Summer 2004, at
13. At the same time, finding a financial planner who will tell you to expect to be able to
spend 7% is easy.
87 This is something everybody feels entitled to have an opinion about. Like everyone
feels entitled to run a restaurant. See HOWARD CANNON & BRIAN TARCY, THE COMPLETE
IDIOT’S GUIDE TO STARTING YOUR OWN RESTAURANT (2002). As proof that everyone feels
entitled to run a restaurant, I note that on June 2, 2004, this guide was the 2,327th best
seller on Amazon.com. THE COMPLETE IDIOT’S GUIDE TO RETIRING EARLY was the
26,277th best seller on the same date.
88 My intuition and my unsystematic inquiry of individuals lead me to this conclu-
sion. See UNITED STATES TRUST CORP., WHAT THE WEALTHY THINK: THE U.S. TRUST
ANNUAL SURVEY OF AFFLUENT AMERICANS at http://www.ustrust.com/public/ustrust (last
visited Feb. 23, 2005). I say sensible people in the text because I want you to ignore the
obvious point that “you can never be too rich or too thin.” John Tierney, On this Isle,
Material Is No Instinct, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2001 at B1. Of course, one might like 100%
a day, but this is about sensible expectations. “Too rich, too thin” has been attributed to the
Duchess of Windsor. See id. When I ask a middle-class person, “Suppose you saved
$500,000 as a nest egg for retirement, what do you think it ought to give you a year?,” the
person says $25,000 or more often $50,000. If I say “no way” to $50,000, the response is
often some version of “How about $25,000?”
89 The result is the same if you ask, “If you had a relative who left you a million
dollars, what do you think it ought to generate each year?”
90 I believe that a world of financial planners will tell their customers that they can
accept the number? Why do so many people feel entitled to spend 5% of
their assets annually, serenely sure they will do their portfolios no harm?87
Let me offer some possible answers.
1. Five Has an Air of Compromise
Five percent is a Goldilocks number. The number is not too big and
not too small; not too hot or not too cold. Compromise? Compromise
between what and what? Truth be told, I believe that many sensible people
would like to have, feel vaguely entitled to, or would like to default to a
10% return88 (or at least something more meaningful than 5%). Ask lay
people what dollar amount they think their savings ought to produce and
their answer often turns out to be 10% of the nest egg. That is, ask people
who have not thought about these things, “If you manage to save $500,000
for retirement, what do you think it ought to generate for you?,” and the
answer is often something like $50,000.89 I believe folks who say that
usually are told that such a return is not realistic, especially by trusts
lawyers.90 At that point, cutting the hoped-for return in half sounds quite
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rely on their retirement assets to produce 7% a year, but there aren’t many 7% unitrusts.
See, e.g., Barry Riley, Face to Face: Future Looks a Bit Brighter, Though Still a Little
Tricky: Collective Investment Funds Will Benefit From Savings Trends, But Industry
Problems Remain: The Barry Riley Interview, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2004, at 4, available at
2004 WL 90107329. Compare Jonathan T. Guyton, Decision Rules and Portfolio Manage-
ment for Retirees: Is the “Safe” Initial Withdrawal Rate Too Safe?, J. FIN. PLAN., Oct.
2004, at  http://www.fpanet.org/journal/articles/2004_Issues/jfp1004-art6.cfm (last visited
Feb. 5, 2005) (“This paper finds that applying these Decision Rules produces a maximum
‘safe’ initial withdrawal rate as high as 5.8 percent to 6.2 percent depending on the
percentage of the portfolio that is allocated to equities.”). 
91 Five percent actually was a compromise figure for the private foundation payout
rule. Some legislators wanted a 6% payout rule. See Steve Forbes, Fact and Comment:
Uncharitable Abuse, FORBES, Sept. 15, 2003, at 25, 26. This is a classic example of fra-
ming. In a risk context, “framing” has been defined as:
When people confront risky decisions—such as deciding whether to settle a case
or to proceed to trial—they categorize their decision options as potential gains or
losses from a salient reference point such as the status quo. This categorization,
or “framing,” of decision options influences the way people evaluate options and
affects their willingness to incur risk. People tend to make risk-averse decisions
when choosing between options that appear to represent gains and risk-seeking
decisions when choosing between options that appear to represent losses. For
example, most people prefer a certain $100 gain to a 50% chance of winning
$200 but prefer a 50% chance of losing $200 to a certain $100 loss. 
Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 794 (2001); see also Jeffrey
J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61, 98
(2000); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahnemann, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J.
BUS. S251, S274 (1986). Chris Farrell, a regular commentator on Sound Money, a Natural Public
Radio financial show said, in the summer of 2004, that one could hope to get 4% to 6% from one’s
retirement assets. What is the compromise figure? Answer: 5%. See Chris Farrell, Retirement
C o u n t d o w n  ( N P R  b r o a d c a s t ,  J u l y  1 7 ,  2 0 0 4 )  a v a i l a b l e  a t
http://soundmoney.publicradio.org/display/web/2004/07/17/retirement_countdown/ (last visited
Feb. 5, 2005) (“Most financial planners use a figure that you can withdraw somewhere between 4
and 6 percent of your portfolio a year.”). With all due respect, I believe that most planners are not as
conservative as the estimable Chris Farrell proposes.
92 I have a friend who thinks medical advances may allow him to live for hundreds of
accommodating and flexible on the part of the client, and so I am comfort-
able calling 5% a compromise number. I suspect that clients go through
this process in their own mind, as much or more than in conferences with
advisers, and this process also allows them compliantly to accept the
suggestion made by the adviser.91
Five percent is also a compromise on the question of longevity: “If I
am going to live to 105, I should only spend 3% and if I am going to die
next year, I really should spend 55% and go to Paris. So, I will compro-
mise and do 5%.”92
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years. He invests in London residential real estate. Relatively recently, The Economist
noted that London residential real estate was the best performing asset category, in price
terms, in a particular time period. See The Foresight Saga, ECONOMIST, Jan. 4, 2003.
93 Just as the imperial storm troopers passed by Luke Skywalker and the droids in Star
Wars under the influence of the magic of Obe Wan Kenobi. STAR WARS, EPISODE IV: A
NEW HOPE (Twentieth Century Fox 1977).
94 The Money River, where the wealth of the nation flows. We were born
on the banks of it—and so were most of the mediocre people we grew
up with . . . . We can slurp from that mighty river to our hearts’ con-
tent. And we even take slurping lessons, so we can slurp more effi-
ciently.
KURT VONNEGUT, JR., GOD BLESS YOU, MR. ROSEWATER OR PEARLS BEFORE SWINE 104
(1965).
95 In teaching, I have found it close to impossible to teach successfully a rule with
more than five elements. Indeed, students prefer rules with three factors. I have the in-
tuitive sense that minority rules of law often contain more elements than majority rules.
96 “Calouste Gulbenkian was a fabulously successful middleman who became known
as ‘Mr. Five Percent’ after he secured himself a one-twentieth share in the Iraq Petroleum
Company.” THE RICH ARE DIFFERENT 154 (Jon Winokur ed. 1996).
97 At the risk of seeming very strange, I note, without more, several web sites
describing the magic effect of five on the human psyche. See, e.g.,
http://www.greatdreams.com/five/five.htm; http://goldennumber.net/five(5).htm (last
visited Feb. 5, 2005). In that regard, I quote the late Jesse Dukeminier:
Why five? I have consulted books on numerology and find that Pythagoras
regarded five as the number of Justice, Plato’s Republic gave it as the number of
the State, and five is connected by astrologers to Jupiter. A. FOWLER, SPENSER
AND THE NUMBERS OF TIME 34-47, 206 (1964). A more modern numerologist
says, ‘Number 5 symbolizes the law of gathering new experiences.’ MORRIS C.
GOODMAN, NUMEROLOGY 24 (1949). I rather think this will prove to be true
under the Uniform Statute.
Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: Ninety Years in
Limbo, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1033 n.23 (1987). So, I am not crazy, I am continuing the
Similarly, 5% seems safe and sane. In the universe of all possible pay-
out rates, 5% does not seem too greedy. It seems like a sensible bargain to
make with fate. If I ask for too much I will be struck down. If I act like a
little guy or if I act without hubris, maybe the fates will pass me by.93
Also, I am entitled to slip in a little for myself.94 Of course, the same could
be said of any number lower than 5%, but five does seem to be the highest
bearable low number.95 So, five is a compromise number, and many of us
like to compromise.
2. We Just Plain Old Like the Number Five96
Five has some magic power over us. We have an inordinate faith in
the number five.97 Why? The simplest explanation is that our fingers and
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work of a great man, Jesse Dukeminier. I offer this quote, as well: “First, the belief that
endowments and trusts can spend 5% of the value of their assets in perpetuity without
harming future beneficiaries is ubiquitous that it seems to be hardwired in the brain.”
James P. Garland, The Fecundity of Endowments and Long-Duration Trusts, in ECONOM-
ICS AND PORTFOLIO STRATEGY, Sept. 15, 2004, at 5 (copy on file with author).
98 “There is very little doubt that the almost universal popularity of base 10 stems
simply from the fact that we happen to have ten fingers.” MARIO LIVIO, THE GOLDEN
RATIO 19 (2002).
99 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
100 I think that a world of financial planners that will advise a retirement take out of 7
or 7½%. See Kenneth Hooker, Options, Retirement Goal May Conflict, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 20, 2004, at C4. Interestingly, Hartford Financial offers a variable annuity which
guarantees a return of principal if the principal is not withdrawn at a rate greater than 7% a
year. See James K. Glassman, Investing, What the Boom Will Do in 2010, WASH. POST.,
May 23, 2004, at F1.
101 Jean-Baptiste Van der Henst, Laure Carles & Dan Sperber, Truthfulness and
Relevance in Telling the Time, 17 MIND & LANGUAGE 457 (2002), available at
http://www.dan.sperber.com/telling.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2005). This point is also
made in Sperber, supra note 47.
102 Van der Henst, Carles & Sperber, supra note 101.
toes come in sets of five. Five is automatic for us. Five is our digital de-
fault number. 
We think in terms of ten and to a lesser extent in terms of numbers
that divide into ten. We are decimalists. We use a base ten number sys-
tem.98 Five is the largest number that divides evenly into ten, and as dis-
cussed above, no adviser will sit still for the number ten.99 Indeed, five is
the largest number for which most estates lawyers will sit still when de-
signing a unitrust.100 So, we are drawn to ten, numbers that divide into ten,
and to the largest number that divides into ten (five), if for no other reason
than a bigger return makes everyone happy, except the remainder benefi-
ciary, who usually does not get a voice in the proceedings. 
3. Five Percent Is an Easy Heuristic
Professor Sperber asserted that “[s]omeone approached in the street
and asked ‘What time is it?’ at a point when her watch reads (for instance)
3:08 is likely to answer ‘It is 3:10.’”101 Why do we take the extra step of
rounding to the nearest multiple of five rather than giving the easier and
more exact answer of 3:08? Sperber also claims that speakers are trying to
provide information relevant to the listener and aim for accuracy only to
the extent it is necessary for relevance.102
Providing the time in multiples of five is relevant because the activi-
ties of most people are scheduled in multiples of five. According to
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103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 See Jonathan Clements, Another Number to Fret About: The Key to Retirement Is
Your Withdrawal Rate, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 2004, at D1 (using 5%).
Sperber, “This is true . . . of almost all appointments, TV programs,
[movies,] and university courses.”103 An exception that proves the rule is
transport schedules, which are often specific to the minute.104 Rounding
has a purpose and an explanation, so does rounding to five.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, then, it is likely
that someone who asks a stranger in the street for the time, with
no indication of his particular purpose in asking the question, will
not be worse off with an answer rounded to a multiple of five.
According to relevance theory, moreover, it is likely that such a
person will actually be better off with a rounded answer, which
requires less processing effort for the same cognitive benefit.105
In the context of money and time, an answer rounded to five is easy to sell
and easy to buy.
Some of the situations discussed in this Article allow for the “3:08-is-
3:10” type of answer. The casually consulted financial planner who ad-
vises the client that the client’s assets will produce 3% when, twenty years
later, they produce 2.93%, has done her job. Similarly, the retiree who
takes 3% the first year of retirement and decides this percentage was a bit
too generous easily can adjust in year two.106 Here, the rounded answer is
quite useful. 
Rounding likely is not useful if the rounding is too dramatic, for ex-
ample if 3% is rounded to 5%. Similarly, the casual answer likely is not
useful if a settlor is creating an irrevocable unitrust. Having said that, how-
ever, the fact that 5% is an easy heuristic is undeniable.
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107 Merchants set prices that will extract the largest amount of money that a number of
customers will  pay. See generally  WIKIPEDA, PRICE POINT, at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Price_points (last modified Feb. 15, 2005) (discussing the demand for
products based on pricing). Thus, one might imagine one merchant saying to another: “No one will
pay more than ten dollars for a rag like that. OK. We’ll price it at $9.99.” 
I think that 5% is the highest unitrust percentage a self-respecting lawyer will
“allow.” I am open to the argument that thoughtful lawyers now are counseling against 5%
because that percentage is too high. Thus, I am fascinated by a statement I read but cannot
find that the most popular unitrust percentage in New York in 2003 was 4.75%. Five
percent is too high? How about 4.75%? Sold. I also think 5% has become the agreed upon,
heuristic, quick and dirty percentage for spending out of a retirement nest egg. See
Clements, sources cited supra notes 86 and 106. This assertion is more supportable to the
extent that retirees can always cut back if they see that too much is being spent. Lawyers
and financial planners save time and energy not arguing with clients if 5% sells. Life is the
art of the possible. Do not let best get in the way of good. I think that a world of financial
planners will counsel 7% because people really like this “price.” “Hey, I will be retired by
the time my client discovers 7% is too high.”
108 “Dentists’ odds of suicide ‘are 6.64 times greater than the rest of the working age
population,’ writes researcher Steven Stack. ‘Dentists suffer from relatively low status within the
medical profession and have strained relationships with their clients—few people enjoy going to
the dentist.’” See Cecil Adams, Do Dentists Have the Highest Suicide Rate?, Suicide Reference
Library, at http://www.suicidereferencelibrary.com/test4~id~1367.php (last visited Feb. 10, 2005).
109 See Dobris, Speculations on the Idea of “Speculation” in Trust Investing, supra
note 3. Professor Dale has written about speculation thusly: Harvey P. Dale & Michael
Gwinell, Time for Change: Charity Investment and Modern Portfolio Theory, 3 CHARITY
L. & PRAC. REV. 89 (1995) (“The use of the word ‘speculative’ is more pejorative than
analytical. It tends to confuse more than to illuminate. There is no workable test for
determining whether an investment is ‘speculative.’ The label is inconsistent with some of
the most important teachings of modern portfolio theory, e.g., that no investment can be
judged in isolation, and that diversification—even into more volatile securities—tends to
reduce overall portfolio risk. It should be abjured by all careful thinkers. But just as there
is no such thing as a speculative investment per se, so there is no such thing as a prudent
investment per se.”).
4. Five Percent is a Price Point107
Savvy advisers suggest 5% because it sells. It is what people want to
hear. It lures in more customers. It gets them out of the office faster. 
Similarly, advisers do not like to give people advice that people do not
like. Nobody likes the dentist.108 We also do not like the building inspector
or the short seller.109 We are an optimistic people.
5. We Have Positive Associations With the Number Five
Given a choice between five and four (a better, but not the best, per-
cent to use for payout purposes at this time, if the goal is impartiality or
66 40 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST JOURNAL
110 Chris Farrell thinks that financial planners see a 4 to 6% world for retirees. With
all due respect, I am less sure. 
111 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument in Favor of
Constitutional Meta-Analysis in State Action Determination, 94 MICH. L. REV. 302 (1995).
The state action doctrine would benefit from borrowing an analytical device
developed by the scientific community: meta-analysis. In the sciences, a study
must have a 95% confidence rate before it will be accepted as valid. A study
with a confidence rate less than 95% is not accorded dispositive weight. In a
rough sort of way, this corresponds to the requirement that a defendant satisfy a
particular state action test completely before a court will find the presence of
state action.
There is, however, an emerging trend within the scientific community
toward the adoption of a new procedure called “meta-analysis.” Meta-analysis
involves the grouping together of data from studies with confidence rates of less
than 95% in order to create a single study with a confidence rate that equals or
exceeds 95%. Evidently, a growing number of scientists believes that the whole
is greater than the sum of the parts. Thus, using meta-analysis, it is possible to
reach the requisite 95% confidence level, even if none of the individual studies
used in the meta-analysis meets the 95% threshold. 
Id. at 337.
112 As to the willingness to rely on science, see Holly D. Doremus, Listing Decisions
Under the Endangered Species Act: Why Better Science Isn’t Always Better Policy, 75
WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1037-39 (1997).
preservation of capital) people will choose five, in part, because of the
positive associations. No lawyer ever offers the client six, so I cannot say
if five would mesmerize if six also were offered, because if a choice is
given, the choice is likely between five and a smaller number.110 
The behavioral economics notion of “affect” plays a role. When given
a choice, affect may cause people to irrationally choose the option with
which they have the most positive associations. Affect is the tendency to
choose that with which one has positive associations when given a choice.
The number five has a special effect. Constant repetition of the number in
relevant literature makes it familiar.
6. The Triviality of Five 
A fairly standard statistical convention in many areas of science al-
lows an investigator to claim to have proven a hypothesis if appropriately
chosen statistical tests show no more than a 5% probability that the ob-
served phenomenon could have happened by random chance.111 This sug-
gests two things. First, holy mother science has made the determination
that 5% is trivial.112 Second, and more generally, it suggests that the
human mind sees the 5% of results that deviate from the successful 95%
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113 “What this country needs is a good five-cent cigar.” See JOHN BARTLETT, FAMIL-
IAR QUOTATIONS 673 (Emily Morison Beck et al. eds., Little, Brown & Co. 15th ed. 1980)
(quoting Thomas Riley Marshall); see also DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, PERFECTLY LEGAL:
THE COVERT CAMPAIGN TO RIG OUR TAX SYSTEM TO BENEFIT THE SUPER RICH—AND
CHEAT EVERYBODY ELSE 310 (2003) (“The idea that a dollar out of wages that have been
taxed should earn nickels of interest free of tax has an appeal.”)).
114 See ANDREW SMITHERS & STEPHEN WRIGHT, VALUING WALL STREET 216 (2000)
(indicating that the average annual yield on American stocks from 1802 to 1998 was
5.2%). I thank Jim Garland for pointing out this source, and many others, to me. Ulti-
mately, whether a 5% payout is sustainable is outside the scope of this Article. If you
believe a 5% payout is sustainable at this time, then this Article is of no interest to you. I
do not and thus I am discussing a curious phenomenon and fussing about the conduct of
supposedly rational actors. One easy explanation to accept is that although returns were
swell for a while (i.e., once, a long time ago, in a far distant land) things are degrading to
the mean as they must. See Andrew Smithers, The Longer You Play the More You Lose
SUNDAY TIMES, May 16, 2004, available at http://www.smithers.co.uk/news.shtml (last
visited Feb. 23, 2005).
115 At one point in time, let me say in the 1960s, money earned 5%. Banks paid 5%
on savings accounts, and the dividend stream on the S&P was in the four-plus range. So,
some of us have a cultural memory of 5% returns that actually existed and those were
conservative investments.
116 I am not the only one. See Robert D. Arnott & Peter L. Bernstein, What Risk
Premium is “Normal”?, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Mar.-Apr. 2002, at 64; Robert D. Arnott &
Ronald J. Ryan, The Death of the Risk Premium, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Spring 2001, at 61;
Garland, supra note 1.
117 C.W. Maris van Sandelingenambacht, Nietzsche Niëzky Nijinsky, 24 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1261, 1271, n.31 (2003) (“In The Second Dance Song, Zarathustra’s longed-for
mistress Life reproaches him that he will leave her. But then he whispers in her ear his
that prove the hypothesis as trivial. So, abracadabra, 5% is trivial, and a
trivial payout is surely an acceptable payout. We always have seen a five
cent item as trivial, but worth having—thus the once perceived national
need for a good five cent cigar.113
7. Historical Data Suggests to Some that Five Percent May Be
Obtainable114
The case for 5% is simple; historical data suggests to some that 5%
may be obtainable in any given year, for any given investor.115 I dis-
agree.116
Why do I disagree? The past is not prologue. The past does not predict
the future in matters of this sort. The sun likely will rise tomorrow, but
who knows about stock performance. The problem is exacerbated by the
human tendency to extrapolate past patterns. Yet, we are taught to judge
the future by the past and that history repeats itself.117 This concept is part
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doctrine of Eternal Return—history repeats itself in great cosmic cycles; everything that is
taking place now will recur again some day.”).
118 Arnott & Bernstein, supra note 116.
119 Arnott & Ryan, supra note 116.
120 See SMITHERS & WRIGHT, supra note 114; Arnott & Bernstein, supra note 116.
121 Garland, supra note 58.
122 Arnott & Bernstein, supra note 116.
123 Henry Blodget, The Wall Street Self Defense Manual Part 2: How Long is “The
Long Run”?, SLATE (July 21, 2004), at http://slate.msn.com/id/2103959/.
124 I thank Jim Garland for the point. See also Arnott & Bernstein, supra note 116.
125 Id. 
of our hardwiring. As Arnott and Bernstein told us, “[B]ecause investors
see these same long-term historical numbers year after year, these expecta-
tions are now embedded in the collective psyche of the investment com-
munity.”118 But as Arnott and Ryan cautioned us, “Extrapolating the past
is one of the most common and dangerous ways to forecast the future. The
past is not prologue.”119
The preceding paragraph refers to historical numbers. What historical
numbers? Investors consider two sets of numbers. The first type is yearly
returns. A number of years passed when the market returned 5% or bet-
ter.120 In approximately forty of the seventy-five years covered by the
Ibbotson data, spending 5% was acceptable or even too low under the
Garland Rule. Five percent was too low in the late 1970s and early 1980s
and has been too high ever since then. Nineteen eighty-four was the last
year that 5% was a correct rule. Since then 5% has been too high, using
the Garland Rule.121 In 1991, the payout should have been below 3% and
in 1997 below 2%.
The second number investors consider is average returns. Long-term
historical data suggest that over a seventy-five year period, stocks aver-
aged an 11% return (8% real return after approximately 3% inflation).122
Moreover, over 200 years, U.S. stocks averaged a 10% return (7% real re-
turn after approximately 3% inflation).123 This information is correct, but
there are problems. First, investors received the average return in few, if
any, years. Second, no one can guarantee that any future year will produce
a past average return. Third, a large fraction of past return came from high
dividend yields and upwards revaluations of stock prices.124 Today, div-
idend yields are low and significant stock price appreciation seems un-
likely.125 For a number of reasons, 11% returns are not a realistic expecta-
tion for the future.
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126 Sam Savage, The Flaw of Averages, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 8, 2000,
available at http://www.stanford.edu/~savage/flaw/Article.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
127 Id.
128 See Clements, supra note 18; Bernstein, supra note 18.
129 Id. (quoting Moshe Milevsky, a finance professor at York University in Toronto).
130 People saving for retirement may discover their nest eggs are not as big as average
returns suggested. Therefore the retirees may get hit twice by the phenomenon discussed in
the text—too small a nest egg and spending according to plan depletes that too small nest
egg.
A similar problem is that percentage returns will not be smooth and steady because of
the inevitable volatility of portfolio value. See Dobris, Real Return, supra note 21;
Garland, supra note 4.
131 See Dan Seligman, Good Breeding, NATIONAL REVIEW, Jan. 28, 2002, at 53
(reviewing NICHOLAS WRIGHT GILLHAM, A LIFE OF SIR FRANCIS GALTON (Oxford 2001)),
at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1282/is_1_54/ai_81775384 (last visited
Feb. 23, 2005).
132 PETER BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS 170 (1996).
133 Id. at 178 (discussing a study by two Baylor University professors, William
Reichenstein and Dovalee Dorsett). The colloquial phrase is “Buy on sale.” Buy your
8. The Flaw of Averages126
The problem with the law of averages is just that—the law is about
averages. One is reminded of the joke about the statistician who drowned
in a river that was, on average, only three feet deep.127 In the investment
context, the so-called “flaw of averages” occurs when investors assume
they will obtain the stock market’s average return each and every year.128
As Professor Milevsky asserted, “People don’t realize that averages can be
meaningless. . . . It’s how you get there that counts.”129 Thus, the sequence
of returns is essential; poor returns early in retirement can deplete assets
by reducing principal early in the game. Spending principal from a de-
pleted portfolio early on means that even when the market recovers, one’s
portfolio will recover more slowly. Shares that have been sold will not rise
in value when the market rises, or at least not in your portfolio.130
9. Regression to the Mean
Sir Francis Galton first identified the concept of regression, or rever-
sion, to the mean when he observed that sons of tall fathers tended to be
shorter than their fathers while sons of short fathers tended to be taller.131
The sons regressed to the mean. In the stock market context this means,
among other things, that “[w]hat goes up must [generally] come down.”132
Peter Bernstein told us that “bad periods in the market are predictably
followed by good periods, and vice versa.”133 The recent bull market’s av-
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European small cap value allocation when the asset category is out of fashion. Buy next
year’s Christmas cards on Boxing Day.
134 “From 1926 through 2003, the S&P 500 stock index achieved an average total
return of 10.4 percent. (Total return includes dividends and price gains.) But for the period
from 1982 through 1999, the average total return of the S&P 500 was an unprecedented
18.7 percent.” Terry Savage, Expect More Modest Gains in Stocks Over Next Decade,
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http://www.suntimes.com/output/savage/cst-fin-terry175.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
135 Blodget, supra note 123.
136 Id.
137 Paula H. Hogan, The Shrinking Equity Premium and What it Means to Investors, AAII J.,
Oct.  2002, at 17, available at http://www.aaii.com/promo/20040621/pswkshp.shtml.
138 Id. “[T]he equity [or risk] premium . . . measures the excess return of stocks over
the return offered by risk-free assets—how much higher a return we may expect, on
average, from stocks than from U.S. Treasuries. In other words, it measures the compensa-
tion for the risk of being an owner.” Id.
139 Id.
140 “[T]he relationship between risk and reward does not always hold. Over the past
two decades, gold and silver, and some emerging markets have not only been more volatile
than equities or bonds in America or Britain, say, but they have also yielded much lower
average returns.” The Foresight Saga, supra note 92, at 61. One factor contributing to low
dividends is stock buybacks. Many corporations are buying back their own stock, often at
erage annual return is almost double the 200 year average.134 Reversion to
the mean suggests that future returns likely will swing the other way.
“[A]fter two decades of above-trend stock performance, we’re probably
due for a decade or two below trend. . . .”135 Stock and bond performance
in the near future possibly will be as good or better than during the eight-
ies and nineties, but it does not seem that likely. “[W]e are in the early
years of a 10-year to 20-year ‘regression’ in which the returns on financial
assets will disappoint.”136
10. The Equity Premium
Investment advisers generally understand that investors want a pre-
mium for taking the risk of investing in equity. A general assumption was
that the so-called equity premium was as high as 7 or 8%.137 A consensus
is emerging that the equity premium (the return advantage of stocks over
government bonds) of the future is nowhere near the 7 to 8% equity
premium of the past.138 Many are predicting a 2 to 4% equity premium,
“which implies a 5% to 7% [total, nominal] annual future return for an all-
stock portfolio.”139 While the idea that if equity premium goes down it
indicates that stocks are less risky is appealing, this does not appear to be
the case.140 Arnott and Bernstein asserted that “[t]he observed real stock
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or above market value rather than paying out additional dividends, investing in company
growth, or investing in new ventures. 
141 Arnott & Bernstein, supra note 116, at 64, 80.
142 Id. at 64.
143 Id. at 64, 81.
144 Arnott & Ryan, supra note 116, at 61, 62.
145 Id. at 61 (explaining with clarity the idea that the greatest return is to be found
when an entity is privately held).
146 See Garland, supra note 1.
147 The Foresight Saga, supra note 92, at 60.
returns, and the excess return for stocks relative to bonds in the past 75
years has been extraordinary, largely as a result of important nonrecurring
developments [and not due solely to risk].”141 The high equity premium of
the past was due to rising valuation levels and high dividend yields, which
have since diminished and cannot be expected to return.142 Arnott & Bern-
stein suggested that “future real returns for both stocks and bonds is
around 2-4%” and that a normal risk premium is approximately 2.4%.143 If
their predictions are anywhere near target, those who spend 5% out of
their nest eggs or who are supported by 5% unitrusts will be dining on
Alpo sooner than expected.
11. Earnings and Dividends Cannot Grow Faster Than the Economy
Itself
Dividend or earnings growth cannot exceed actual economic growth,
in the very long run, otherwise earnings and dividends would grow larger
than the economy itself.144 To make matters worse, because some of the
economic growth comes from new enterprises, in which one cannot or-
dinarily invest, real growth in dividends and earnings on traded stocks are
capped well below the real growth of the economy.145
12. Fees, Taxes, and Inflation
Investors often see gross returns, not net returns. Another reason in-
vestors believe that taking 5% will not diminish their principal is that
when average returns are contemplated, the diminishing effects of invest-
ment fees and taxes rarely are taken into account. Even if fees and taxes
are only 1 to 2%, they still will decrease the amount that can be taken
safely without cannibalizing too much of the principal.146 “Dealing costs
take a big bite out of the final value of a fund because of the power of
compound interest, which exaggerates the impact of small differences in
annual returns over long periods.”147 Inflation is another factor that is often
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148 “Inflation can be defined as the overall general upward price movement of goods and
services in an economy.” U.S. Dep’t of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, Overview of BLS
Statistics on Inflation and Consumer Spending, at http://www.bls.gov/bls/inflation.htm (last
modified Dec. 28, 2004).
149 MoneyChimp, Inflation, at http://www.moneychimp.com/articles/econ/
inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
150 I speculate about this in Dobris, Speculations on the Idea of “Speculation” in
Trust Investing, supra note 3, at 474-75. One also is reminded of the woman at the table
next to Meg Ryan’s table in the famous scene in WHEN HARRY MET SALLY (Castle Rock
Entertainment 1989). 
151 See Dobris, Speculations on the Idea of “Speculation” in Trust Investing, supra
note 3, at 474-75; Sullivan, supra note 2.
152 I try to grapple with this in Dobris, Speculations on the Idea of “Speculation” in
Trust Investing, supra note 3. Rich folks often, but not always, pay lower fees, too. I thank
Jim Garland for this point.
153 See generally Clements, sources cited supra notes 86 and 106.
154 THE CRANBERRIES, EVERYBODY IS DOING IT, SO WHY CAN’T WE? (THE COM-
PLETE SESSIONS 1991-1993) (Island Records 1994).
155 I.R.C. § 4942(e) (2000). The 5% charity rate is misleading to the extent that charities
overlooked.148 Since 1913, inflation has averaged 3% per year, which
means that a 7% nominal return is really only 4% after inflation.149 Add in
taxes and fees, and a 7% return becomes a 2 to 3% real return. To spend
5% without diminishing capital, one would need a 10% yearly, not aver-
age, total return.
Prosperous folks may be confusing themselves with rich folks.150 Rich
folks actually may be able to get 5% at this time.151 It may well be that rich
folks have access to superior returns, and their trustees invest in a way that
allows them to pay out 5% without cannibalizing the portfolio. Taking that
as so, the idea that folks with less money foolishly may think they can get
the same return as rich folks is easy to believe, even though they do not
have access to the better investment advice, investment classes, and in-
vestment vehicles that rich folks do.152
13. People Rely on Easily Obtainable Information
Information suggesting that 5% is a good idea is easy to obtain.
Information suggesting that 5% is a bad idea is harder to obtain and harder
to understand. Why look for complicated bad news when good news is
easily available?153
14. Everybody is Doing It154
Government has sanctioned both percentages and 5%. Five percent is
the mandated annual payout for private foundations.155 Many state prin-
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currently are allowed to allocate certain costs of operation and treat them as distributions; that is, the
law does not require the actual expenditure of 5% for charitable purposes. See Nina J. Crimm, A
Case Study of a Private Foundation’s Governance and Self-Interested Fiduciaries Calls for Further
Regulation, 50 EMORY L.J. 1093, 1126 (2001); Peter Frumkin, The Ironies of Foundation Regula-
tion, THE CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Feb. 5, 2004, at 31. (“Under the plan, foundations would no
longer be able to count administrative assets, such as salaries and office rent, when figuring whether
they meet federal requirements to distribute at least 5 percent of their assets to charity each year.”)
This column is based on Peter Frumkin, Trouble in Foundation Land: Looking Back, Looking
Ahead, at http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/FrumkinMonograph.pdf; see also I.R.C. § 664
(dealing with charitable remainder unitrusts and engages the notion of a minimum 5% payout).
156 Delaware has made a statutory provision for unitrusts. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12,
§ 3527 (2004); see also http://www.leimberg.com/freeResources/truStates.asp (last visited
Feb. 8, 2005).
157 Delaware has made a statutory provision for 5% unitrusts. See DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 12, § 3527 (2004). A Delaware 5% unitrust is dealt with in McNeil v. McNeil, 798
A.2d 503 (Del. 2002); see also Sitkoff, supra note 43, at 652-54 (discussing the unitrust).
158 Treas. Reg. § 1.643(b) (2004) (defining “income” for trust purposes).
159 See Dobris, Real Return, supra note 21; see generally Garland, supra note 1.
cipal and income statutes incorporate unitrusts156 and inferentially bless a
5% payout, in some fashion, in their unitrust section.157 Recent regulations
under section 643 of the Code allow a marital deduction for unitrusts if the
unitrust amount is between 3% and 5%, and a state statute allows a uni-
trust for a surviving spouse.158 Many colleges and universities use percent-
age payouts when they spend from endowment and, having made the
percentage payout decision, many choose a 5% spending rate.159 If this
percentage is good enough for Uncle Sam, the state legislature, and the
state university, then the percentage is good enough for me. In other
words, the 5% unitrust and the 5% spending rate is a tree with deep roots.
III.  CONCLUSION
When I began thinking about this question, the certainty that 5% trust
payouts were sustainable was monolithic. As time has gone by, some
people have come to understand that 5% is optimistic, at best, at this time.
I would say that reason has begun to erode the emotional certainty that we
are all entitled to 5%. I do, however, think decades will pass before “why
five?” will be an irrelevant question. 
